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CORPORATE MISCONDUCT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Richard C. Ausness1

INTRODUCTION
Sadly, many pharmaceutical companies have engaged in unethical
or illegal behavior.2 The current opioid crisis is the most recent example of misconduct by pharmaceutical companies.3 Moreover, this pattern of conduct is neither rare, nor recent. Instead, it is long-standing
and pervasive in nature.4 Furthermore, unlike wrongdoing by other
businesses that cause primarily economic or environmental harm,
wrongdoing by pharmaceutical companies, like that of asbestos or tobacco companies, may cause personal injuries and death on a large
scale.5
Part I of this Article discusses corporate misconduct in general and
provides a number of examples of prominent corporate wrongdoing
over the past three decades. Part II of this Article focuses on unethical
practices by pharmaceutical companies. This includes manipulation of
the results of clinical trials and fraud in connection with the marketing
and promotion of prescription drugs, including dissemination of false
information to doctors and patients, targeting vulnerable groups,
secretly financing key opinion leaders and front groups, as well as engaging in kickbacks and bribery.
Part III provides a sample of case studies illustrating misconduct by
drug companies over the past sixty years. Among the products discussed are MER/29, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (IUD), Botulinum Toxin (Botox), Neurontin, Lupron, Vioxx, and Paxil. This sets
the stage for a discussion of OxyContin and its contribution to the
1. Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1966 and J.D., 1968,
University of Florida; L.L.M. Yale Law School. I would like to thank the University of Kentucky
J. David Rosenberg College of Law for supporting this research with a summer research grant.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II. Misconduct includes such actions as compromising clinical trials, participating in fraudulent marketing practices, and engaging in kickbacks and bribery.
4. See infra Part III (describing misconduct from 1957 to 2017).
5. For example, it is estimated that Vioxx killed at least 60,000 people. Eugene McCarthy, A
Call to Prosecute Drug Company Fraud as Organized Crime, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 439, 440
(2019).
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current opioid crisis. It shows that the OxyContin experience is not a
“one off” but rather that it reflects a widely accepted business model
that has existed for more than sixty years.
Part IV examines some of the factors that influence corporate behavior and encourage drug company executives to engage in unethical
and illegal behavior. These factors include weak regulation by the federal government, internal and external economic pressure, and cultural influences within the company.
Part V offers some potential solutions to the problem of drug company behavior. First, stricter regulation and oversight by the federal
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is needed. Second, economic
sanctions should be increased. This includes greater criminal liability
for violators and greater civil liability as well. Finally, measures need
to be taken to encourage a more responsible corporate culture.
I. EXAMPLES

OF

CORPORATE MISCONDUCT

The past half-century has produced its share of business scandals.
Corporate scofflaws have included such companies as JohnsManville,6 American International Group (AIG),7 American Tobacco
Co. and other cigarette manufacturers,8 Ford Motor Co.,9 Volkswagen
(VW),10 Enron Corporation (Enron),11 Wells Fargo,12 Exxon,13 Brit-

6. Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturers of This Product May Have Engaged in
Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for Limitless Punitive Awards in Products
Liability Lawsuits, 73 IND. L.J. 187, 219 (1997).
7. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 959–63 (2009).
8. Richard C. Ausness, Conspiracy Theories: Is There a Place for Civil Conspiracy in Products
Liability Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2007).
9. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1015–19
(1991).
10. John C. Cruden et al., Dieselgate: How Investigation, Prosecution, and Settlement of Volkswagen’s Emissions Cheating Scandal Illustrates the Need for Robust Environmental Enforcement, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 118, 123–25 (2018).
11. See generally Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & Erisa Litig. v. Enron. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
12. Julia E. Class, Note, Together We’ll Go Far . . . Away From Court: The Wells Fargo Scandal and the Limits of Its Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 927, 930
(2018).
13. Jeff Kerr, Comment, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Perils of Judicial Punitive Damage
Reform, 59 EMORY L.J. 727, 729–32 (2010).
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ish Petroleum (BP),14 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,15 HealthSouth,16
Lehman Brothers,17 and WorldCom.18
A. Johns-Manville’s Concealment of Asbestos Exposure Risks
One of the most notorious cases of corporate misconduct involved
Johns-Manville and other asbestos manufacturers.19 As early as 1936,
corporate officers attended a secret meeting and agreed to finance a
project to accumulate data to use to rebut claims that exposure to
asbestos posed serious health risks to workers and consumers.20 In addition, one executive at Raybestos intervened on several occasions to
prevent the publication of articles about the occupational health risks
of asbestos.21 Finally, an asbestos trade association suppressed a study
of textile factories that found evidence of asbestosis among workers.22
In other words, asbestos companies knew that their products were
dangerous and did their best to conceal this fact from the public and
government regulators.
Litigation against asbestos manufacturers began in earnest with a
1973 decision by a federal appeals court in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp.23 By 1991, an estimated 715,000 personal injury claims
had been filed against asbestos companies.24 Ultimately, these companies were overwhelmed with lawsuits and most went bankrupt.25
14. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico . . . and the
Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 Bos. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391, 400–01
(2011); Marc R. Stanley, When Bad Companies Happen to Good People, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 517,
522–23 (2008).
15. David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance
Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907, 913–14 (2010).
16. Ken Randall & Hunter Hill, Corporate Governance and the HealthSouth Derivative Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 128, 129 (2010).
17. Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—
Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111,
1113–25 (2011).
18. J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse
of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 227–31 (2003).
19. Mabry, supra note 6, at 219.
20. Ronald L. Motley & Anne McGinnis Kearse, Decades of Deception: Secrets of Lead, Asbestos, and Tobacco, TRIAL, Oct. 1999, at 47, 47.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1317–18 (5th Cir. 1985).
Motley & Kearse, supra note 20, at 47–48.
See generally Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1121–22 (1983).
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B. Concealment of Smoking Risks by Tobacco Companies
Tobacco companies engaged in a similar campaign of deception and
concealment regarding the health effects of smoking.26 As early as the
1950s, tobacco company executives knew that cigarette smoking could
cause lung cancer and other serious health problems.27 In 1953, they
met to develop a plan to protect the market for cigarettes by issuing
misleading press releases, disseminating false information in magazine
articles, concealing evidence of the health risks of smoking from the
public, and by targeting their advertising and promotional efforts at
underage consumers.28 Tobacco companies also falsely assured smokers that “light,” “low tar,” or “low nicotine” cigarettes were less dangerous when they knew that these products did not significantly
reduce the health risks of smoking.29
Although lawsuits by individual consumers usually failed, the tide
began to turn against the tobacco companies in the 1990s as various
states, led by Mississippi, brought suits against cigarette manufacturers, invoking public nuisance, fraud, conspiracy, and other liability
theories.30 Eventually, more than forty states sued the tobacco industry.31 Meanwhile, evidence of corporate fraud and wrongdoing began
to mount,32 and the tobacco companies reached multi-billion dollar
settlements with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota.33 In 1998,
the tobacco companies threw in the towel and agreed to a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the remaining forty-six states.34 The
MSA resolved all of the states’ claims for the costs of treating sick
smokers.35 In return, the tobacco companies agreed to make annual
payments to the states in perpetuity.36
26. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136 (D.D.C. 2000).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 137–38.
30. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 370 (2000).
31. Marie Gabriele Bianchi, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke: Defining the
Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703,
712 (1999).
32. Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the
Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV. 311, 322 (1998) (discussing the impact of the “cigarette papers,” which documented thirty years of fraud and concealment by Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.).
33. Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Forfeiting Federalism: The Faustian Pact with Big Tobacco, 18
RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 291, 295 (2015).
34. Dagan & White, supra note 30, at 371.
35. Id. at 371–72.
36. Andrew J. Haile & Matthew W. Kreuger-Andes, Landmark Settlements and Unintended
Consequences, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 145–46 (2012).
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C. Ford Pinto and Mustang’s Exploding Gas Tanks
One of the most notorious cases of corporate misconduct involved
the Ford Pinto.37 Ford developed the Pinto to compete in the subcompact market.38 While the product design was being evaluated, crash
tests revealed that rear-end collisions could impair the fuel system’s
integrity.39 Although Ford could have easily and inexpensively fixed
this problem, it decided to retain the existing design.40 The company
justified this decision by relying on a cost-benefit analysis that concluded that the cost of redesigning the Pinto’s fuel system would exceed the monetized costs of the expected deaths and injuries.41 During
the early years of production, the Pinto was a commercial success, but
numerous consumers reported accidents involving exploding gas tanks
in rear-end collisions.42 Nevertheless, for more than five years, Ford
refused to fix the problem.43
Retribution finally came in 1981 when a California appeals court
upheld a large punitive damage award against the company.44 In
Grimshaw, the jury, outraged at Ford’s conduct, awarded Grimshaw
$2.5 million in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive
damages.45 Upholding the punitive damage award, the appeals court
found that Ford’s management had acted in an extremely reprehensible manner and exhibited a “conscious and callous disregard of public
safety in order to maximize profits.”46
A similar pattern occurred with the Ford Mustang.47 In Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., the occupants of a 1967 Mustang were either killed
or severely injured when the car’s fuel tank burst into flames after
being rear-ended by another vehicle.48 As in Grimshaw, the appellate
court determined that punitive damages were permissible if the facts
37. Maria Guadalupe Martinez Alles, Moral Outrage and Betrayal Aversion: The Psychology
of Punitive Damages, 11 J. TORT L. 245, 289 (2018).
38. Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH. U. L.
REV. 651, 675 (2012).
39. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Ct. App. 1981).
40. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 21 (1985).
41. Acevedo, supra note 38, at 676.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (Ct. App. 1981).
45. Id. at 358. The trial court later reduced this to $3.5 million. Id. at 391.
46. Id. at 388.
47. Craig K. Hemphill, Note, Smoke Screens and Mirrors; Don’t Be Fooled Get the Economic
Facts Behind Tort Reform and Punitive Damages Limitations, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 165
(1997).
48. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Wis. 1980).
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alleged in the complaint were found to be true.49 The facts alleged
that Ford knew of the fire hazard as early as 1964.50 Furthermore,
years before the plaintiffs’ accident, Ford was aware that the fuel tank
design was causing burn injuries but failed to recall its vehicles or
warn about the danger because it wanted to avoid the cost of repairs
and the bad publicity that might be caused by warnings.51
D. Volkswagen’s Diesel Emissions Fraud
Although VW’s fraudulent manipulation of emissions level testing
did not directly endanger occupants of its vehicles, it did amount to a
deliberate and flagrant violation of the law.52 The scandal began in
2014 when the Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines, and Emissions
(CAFEE) published an emissions road testing report that it had done
on several VW diesel automobiles.53 The study revealed that the VW
vehicles emitted nitrogen oxides at levels that were far above permissible Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) levels.54 VW’s coverup began soon after CAFEE engineers reported their findings to the
EPA and the California Air Resources Board.55
E. Enron Corporation’s Financial Fraud
Enron engaged in phony transactions with illusory special purpose
entities, such as Joint Energy Development Incorporated and
Chewco, in order to improve its financial statements.56 Enron’s attorneys, accountants, investment banks, and other financial service providers created these affiliated corporations and made them appear to
be independent entities.57 This scheme ultimately collapsed in 2001
when Enron was forced to revise its earlier financial statements for
1997 through 2000.58 As a result of these disclosures, the price of En49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Cruden et al., supra note 10, at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 123–24. See also GREGORY J. THOMPSON, IN-USE EMISSIONS TESTING OF LIGHTDUTY DIESEL VEHICLES IN THE UNITED STATES 62–63 (2014).
55. Cruden et al., supra note 10, at 123–24.
56. Enron’s scheme is set forth in more detail in Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & Erisa Litig.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
57. Id. at 637–85. According to the complaint, the banks involved in Enron’s fraudulent
scheme included J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., CitiGroup, Credit Suisse, First Boston, CIBC, Merrill Lynch & Co., Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., Bank of America Corp., and Deutsche Bank
AG. Id. at 637–56. Vinson & Elkins LLP was Enron’s principal law firm and Arthur Anderson
was its principal accountant and auditor. Id. at 656–85.
58. Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant Gatekeepers,
40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 107, 114 (2004).
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ron’s stock dropped precipitously, thereby forcing the company to declare bankruptcy.59
F. Wells Fargo Bank’s Consumer Fraud
In 2016, it was revealed that Wells Fargo Bank’s employees, pressured by the company’s sales targets and compensation incentives,
opened approximately 3.5 million unauthorized accounts and funded
them by transferring funds from customers’ accounts without their
knowledge or consent, thereby generating millions of dollars in
charges and fees for the bank.60 Employees also applied for 565,000
credit cards in the name of bank customers, resulting in unauthorized
annual fees and interest charges.61 When aggrieved customers filed
lawsuits against Wells Fargo Bank, the bank attempted to force them
to accept mandatory arbitration, claiming that “[t]he arbitration
clauses included in the legitimate contracts customers signed to open
bank accounts also cover[ed] disputes related to the [unauthorized
accounts].”62
In December 2018, the Attorney General announced a fifty-state
settlement by which Wells Fargo Bank agreed to pay $575 million to
resolve claims that the bank violated state consumer protection laws.63
Wells Fargo Bank also entered into consent orders with federal authorities related to this conduct and agreed to provide restitution to
consumers.64
G. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Misconduct by employees of Exxon and BP caused oil spills that did
incalculable harm to the environment.65 One of the worst of these environmental disasters was the Exxon Valdez oil spill.66 The incident
occurred shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, when the Exxon
Valdez, whose captain had consumed a considerable amount of alco59. Id.
60. Class, supra note 12, at 930.
61. Id. at 930–31.
62. Michael Corkery & Stacey Cowley, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Account Suits by Using Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/
wells-fargo-killing-sham-account-suits-by-using-arbitration.html.
63. Sam Burgess, “Learning from the Past, Transforming for the Future”: The December 2018
Wells Fargo Settlement and Its Implications for the Future of the Bank, in Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2019, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN L. 482, 482 (2019).
64. Id. at 488.
65. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Deepwater Horizon Disaster—Some Liability Issues, 35 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 125, 125–26 (2010).
66. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076–77 (D. Alaska 2004) (describing the environmental effects of the oil spill).
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hol that evening, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound.67 The Exxon Valdez released 20% of its total freight of 964,000
barrels of oil; it is estimated that by April 1989, the oil spill polluted
more than 1,400 square miles of water.68 The spillage also contaminated much of the coastline, killing thousands of animals, including
some of Alaska’s rarest species.69 Furthermore, the oil spill caused
severe economic damage to fishermen and other residents who
worked in the affected area.70
In addition to spending more than $2.1 billion to remove oil from
the waters and beaches of Prince William Sound, both the U.S. government and the State of Alaska sued Exxon civilly and criminally for
environmental damage.71 These lawsuits were eventually settled by a
consent decree under which Exxon agreed to pay the government
plaintiffs $900 million over a period of ten years.72 Exxon was also
prosecuted by the federal government for violating the Clean Water
Act,73 the Refuse Act,74 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,75 the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act,76 and the Dangerous Cargo Act.77 Exxon
and Exxon Shipping were jointly fined $25 million and were ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $100 million.78
H. The BP Oil Spill
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, a movable drilling rig,
exploded, killing eleven men and causing oil to spill out and spread
through the Gulf of Mexico toward the southern coast of the United
States.79 “The Deepwater Horizon was a $350,000,000 offshore oil rig
that measured 378 feet from top to bottom and had a crew of 126. The
rig was operating in 5000 feet of water when an explosion occurred. . . .”80 The rig sank after burning for thirty-six hours, leaving
the well it drilled in the Gulf of Mexico gushing at the ocean bed for
67. Id. at 1076–77.
68. Abeyratne, supra note 65, at 125.
69. Id.
70. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
71. Id. at 1078.
72. Id. at 1078–79.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (2019).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2021); 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1996).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2004); 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1998).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1232b(b)(1) (repealed 2018).
77. 46 U.S.C. § 3718(b) (2006).
78. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (D. Alaska 2004).
79. Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for
Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 819 (2011).
80. Abeyratne, supra note 65, at 126.
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eighty-seven days and causing the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history.81 The ensuing disaster in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in death,
injury, environmental devastation, and economic loss to individuals,
businesses, and governmental entities.82 It was the greatest oil pollution field disaster since the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of
Alaska.83
In order to forestall the inevitable avalanche of lawsuits that were
certain to follow in the wake of this disaster, BP agreed to set up a $20
billion fund to compensate potential plaintiffs and shortly thereafter
selected Kenneth Feinberg to oversee the compensation fund and
claims process.84
I. Crime and Punishment in the Corporate World
It may be possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the
foregoing sampling of corporate wickedness. First, a wide range of
businesses engage in unethical conduct. For example, product manufacturers produce dangerously designed products and conceal these
safety flaws from government regulators and consumers; financial institutions make risky investments and then try to hide the resulting
losses from stockholders and the public; and oil companies risk environmental catastrophes by using shoddy equipment and engaging in
negligent operational practices.85 Not all companies behave in this
way, but a distressingly high number of them do.
Second, not surprisingly, most of this corporate misbehavior is motivated by the relentless pursuit of profits.86 This pressure begins with
investors and trickles down to various levels of corporate management, ultimately leading to a corporate culture where other social values are marginalized.87
Finally, the consequences of getting caught can be devastating. Depending on the conduct involved, a corporation and its officers may
face serious criminal liability if any statutes are violated.88 Further81. Id. at 126–27.
82. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Death at Sea: A Sad Tale of Disaster, Injustice, and Unnecessary
Risk, 71 LA. L. REV. 787, 790 (2011).
83. Id. at 790–91.
84. Mullenix, supra note 79, at 819.
85. These businesses included product manufactures, energy producers, and financial institutions. See supra Part I.
86. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct Beyond the Principal-Agreement Model,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 599–600 (2005).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Fed. Food Drug & Cosm. Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2018) (prohibiting misbranding); Prescription Drug Marketing Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(t) (2018) (prohibiting the promotion of
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more, those who suffer personal injuries, property damage, or economic losses may bring lawsuits against the company, thereby
threatening huge litigation or settlement costs. Even though crime
does not pay in the long run, corporate managers seem to think that it
works in the short run. Unfortunately, they are often right.
II. AN OVERVIEW

OF

BIG PHARMA’S DIRTY TRICKS

Misconduct by pharmaceutical companies falls into a number of categories, including: (1) manipulation of clinical trial design and findings, as well as misrepresentation of such findings in medical and
scientific journals; (2) fraudulent and illegal marketing and promotion
of pharmaceutical products; (3) overproduction of dangerous drugs,
such as opioid manufacturers’ failure to oversee and monitor the distributors of these drugs; and (4) attempts to weaken the power of regulatory agencies, such as the FDA and the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), by aggressive lobbying of government officials and
legislators.89
A. Clinical Trials
The sponsor of a new drug must conduct clinical trials before seeking approval of the drug by the FDA.90 Additional clinical trials are
often conducted after initial FDA-approval to identify other uses or
populations for which the drug might be beneficial.91 Drug companies
and other sponsors conduct about 10,000 of these clinical trials in the
United States each year.92
The approval process usually begins with animal testing to determine the drug’s toxicity.93 The drug then undergoes various types of
clinical trials on human subjects.94 Phase I trials determine whether a
small number of test subjects can tolerate various levels of exposure to
the drug.95 Phase II trials evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the
off-label uses); Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Stat., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(a) (2018)
(prohibiting bribes and kickbacks to healthcare providers).
89. See infra II.A, II.B.
90. Clinical trials are also required for FDA approval of new biologics and medical devices.
Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial
Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 707 n.5 (2009).
91. Id. at 707.
92. Id. at 706.
93. Ryan Sila, Note, Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Testing in an Age of Off-Label Promotion,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 941, 944 (2018).
94. Id. at 945.
95. Id.
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drug on a larger group of people for whom the drug is intended.96
Phase III trials carry out further tests to determine the drug’s safety
and efficacy.97 They are usually the principal studies upon which the
FDA relies in the evaluation process.98
However, one weakness in this scheme is that drug manufacturers,
not the FDA, design the testing protocols and determine who will conduct the trials.99 Because the drug companies decide who will design
and conduct the trials, these researchers have a strong incentive to
produce positive results.100 One technique for influencing the outcome of a clinical trial is to use “enriched enrollment protocols,”
which enables researchers to admit only patients who have responded
well to an earlier trial and exclude those who suffered an adverse reaction in that trial.101 Drug companies also “hobble” the standard
treatment against which they are testing the new drug.102 In such
cases, the researcher either administers the standard treatment in the
wrong dose or they administer it by the wrong route.103 In other
words, they administer the standard treatment in a way that ensures
that it will be less effective than the new drug that they are testing.104
Although drug companies are required to disclose the results of
clinical trials to the FDA, they generally do not have to disclose these
results to the scientific community or the general public since the data
produced are protected as trade secrets.105 Thus, if a drug company
chooses to disclose such information, it may selectively edit it to make
the results look more favorable or fail to disclose information about
unfavorable outcomes.106
96. Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx
and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 756 (2005).
97. Id.
98. Galbraith, supra note 90, at 716.
99. Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Drug Testing to Ensure Drug Safety and Efficacy, 18 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 45, 47 (2015).
100. Id.
101. Eugene McCarthy, The Pharma Barons: Corporate Law’s Dangerous New Race to the
Bottom in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 29, 47
(2018).
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox,
82 IND. L.J. 623, 631–32 (2007).
106. For example, GSK released the results of one study involving Paxil but failed to release
eight other less favorable studies. J. Tori Evans, Clinical Trial Data Bank: The Missing Link in
the Dissemination of Information to the Medical Community, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 69, 70
(2005).
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Another questionable technique is to sponsor ghost-written research and medical education pieces before clinical trials are complete
in order to create a market for a drug prior to FDA approval.107 One
study revealed that drug companies were paying scientists to publish
the results of the same trials in different journals under different authors’ names to give the impression that there was more scientific support for the results of the study than was actually the case.108 There
was also evidence that drug companies sometimes bribed prominent
researchers to add their names to favorable reviews of a drug’s efficacy.109 Finally, drug companies also engage in “publication bias” by
requiring contractual agreements that allow them to delete damaging
information from published results or to delay their publication.110
B. Marketing and Promotion
Drug companies currently spend twice as much on marketing and
promoting existing products than they do on developing new ones.111
Most of the misconduct discussed below involves some aspect of promotion or marketing after a pharmaceutical has been approved. These
activities include: (1) disseminating false or fraudulent information to
doctors or patients, (2) targeting vulnerable groups, (3) financing front
groups, (4) promoting off-label uses, as well as (5) giving kickback
payments and bribes.112
1. Dissemination of False Information
Materials about prescription drugs that are distributed to healthcare
providers and the general public are supposed to be consistent with
FDA-approved labeling.113 A product will be deemed “misbranded”
by the FDA if promotional statements do not conform to FDA requirements.114 However, in order to boost sales, drug companies may
be tempted to minimize a product’s risks or overstate its therapeutic
benefits. For example, the makers of the Dalkon Shield IUD steadfastly maintained that the pregnancy rate for users of their product
107. John Alan Cohan, Psychiatric Ethics and Emerging Issues of Psychopharmacology in the
Treatment of Depression, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 115, 161 (2003).
108. Drummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials, Drug Companies and the FDA, 15 J.L.
& POL’Y 991, 997 (2007).
109. McCarthy, supra note 101, at 47; Deanna Minasi, Note, Confronting the Ghost: Legal
Strategies to Oust Medical Ghostwriters, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 308 (2017).
110. McCarthy, supra note 101, at 50.
111. McCarthy, supra note 5, at 448.
112. See infra III.B.
113. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2019).
114. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (2018).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL104.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 13

CORPORATE MISCONDUCT

11-FEB-22

13:52

13

was only 1.1%, after other testing indicated that the failure rate was at
least five times greater.115 The manufacturer also continued to assure
doctors that the IUD was safe when it knew that the product’s design
allowed bacteria to enter a woman’s uterus.116
Another case of misrepresentation involved the pain medicine Vioxx.117 Although Vioxx was an effective painkiller, testing revealed
that it significantly increased the risk of heart attacks and strokes.118
Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, knew of this risk, but distributed a
brochure to its salespeople that claimed, based on short-term studies,
that Vioxx was safer than competing products for long-term use.119
More recently, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia charged Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin, with misbranding the drug with intent to defraud and mislead.120 The basis of
this criminal charge was that Purdue sales representatives falsely
claimed that OxyContin was less addictive than other oxycodone
products.121 Purdue and three of its officers pled guilty to this charge
and paid more than $600 million in fines and monetary penalties.122
2. Targeting Vulnerable Groups
Taking a page out of Big Tobacco’s playbook, pharmaceutical companies have targeted certain classes of doctors and patients.123 While
some targeting is legitimate, some is not. For example, Purdue directed much of its promotional efforts for OxyContin at general practitioners who were likely to be less familiar with the addictive qualities
of opioids than specialists would be.124 Purdue also targeted vulnerable patient groups such as veterans and the elderly.125
115. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Kan. 1987).
116. Id. at 1222.
117. David R. Culp & Isobel Berry, Comment, Merck and the Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty,
22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 2 (2007).
118. Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case
of Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749, 756 (2006).
119. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265, 276–77 (2011).
120. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (W.D. Va. 2007).
121. Id. at 571.
122. Id. at 572.
123. Caitlyn Edgell, Comment, It’s Time to Finish What They Started: How Purdue Pharma
and the Sackler Family Can Help End the Opioid Epidemic, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. 255, 267
(2020).
124. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 222 (2009).
125. Edgell, supra note 123, at 263, 268.
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3. Secretly Supporting Key Opinion Leaders and Front Groups
Another deceptive practice is secretly exercising control over seemingly independent organizations and “key opinion leaders” (KOLs).126
For example, in order to create a market for its anti-depressant Paxil,
GlaxoSmithKline supported a group of non-profit organizations for
the purpose of increasing public awareness about social anxiety disorder (SAD).127 More recently, Purdue Pharma utilized both front
groups and KOLs to promote the use of OxyContin for the treatment
of chronic pain.128
4. Kickbacks and Bribery
Sometimes, gifts to prescribing physicians go beyond free dinners,
paid vacations, and compensated speaking engagements, crossing into
outright bribery. A subtle form of bribery involves “seeding trials,” in
which physicians are paid to recruit patients to participate in a clinical
trial sponsored or conducted by the manufacturer of the drug in question.129 This encourages participating physicians to prescribe the drug
to their other patients.130 In one case, the manufacturer of the epilepsy drug Neurontin paid more than 700 doctors $300 per patient to
test the drug at higher than approved dosages.131
A particularly blatant instance of bribery involved the drug Subsys.132 In 2017, the founder of Insys Therapeutics and a number of
corporate officers were charged with conspiring to commit racketeering offenses, mail fraud, wire fraud, and payments of kickbacks and
bribes in connection with the prescribing of Subsys.133 The company
began marketing Subsys—a highly-addictive, fentanyl-based sublingual spray—in 2012.134 The drug was approved by the FDA for the
treatment of opioid-tolerant adult patients who experience break126. Sergio Sismondo, Key Opinion Leaders and the Corruption of Medical Knowledge: What
the Sunshine Act Will and Won’t Cast Light On, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 635, 636 (2013).
127. Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Ship of Fools: Health Care Reform, Psychiatry, and
the Uncertain Future of Normality, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181, 235–36 (2011). “SAD”
is an acronym for “Social Anxiety Disorder.” Erin Lenhardt, Note, Why So Glum? Toward a
Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Well-Being of
the Mentally Ill Consumers It Targets, 15 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 165, 197 (2005).
128. SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND 136–37 (2015).
129. Lars Noah, Doctors on the Take: Aligning Tort Law to Address Drug Company Payments
to Subscribers, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 855, 877 (2018).
130. Id. at 877–78
131. Id. at 877.
132. Stacey A. Tovino, Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 901, 909 (2019).
133. Andrew E. Lelling, Corporate Accountability for the Opioid Epidemic, 66 DOJ J. FED. L.
& PRAC. 159, 164 (2018).
134. Id.
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through cancer pain.135 However, according to the federal indictment,
the defendants sought to increase sales of Subsys by paying doctors to
prescribe it for off-label uses such as back pain and migraines.136 A
number of doctors were convicted of receiving hundreds of thousands
of dollars in kickbacks, disguised as speaking fees.137 In May 2019,
John Kapoor and four other Insys employees were convicted of racketeering conspiracy after a lengthy trial.138
III.

CASE STUDIES

This Part will examine a number of cases involving such pharmaceutical products as MER/29, the Dalkon Shield IUD, Botox, Neurontin,
Lupron, Vioxx, Paxil, and OxyContin.139 This list is by no means exhaustive; other problematic pharmaceutical products include: American Home Product’s Fenfluramine, a component of the diet drugs fenphen and Redux;140 Eli Lilly’s antipsychotic medication, Zyprexa;141
Warner-Lambert’s diabetes drug, Rezulin;142 Forest Laboratories’ antidepressant, Celexa;143 Pfizer’s painkiller, Bextra;144 Johnson & Johnson’s acne medicine, Tretinoin (Retin-A);145 AstraZeneca’s cancer
treatment, Zoladex;146 and Janssen Pharmaceuticals’ contraceptive
patch, Ortho Evra.147 In each case, the producers of these products
135. Tovino, supra note 132, at 909.
136. Ty McCoy, The Need for Higher Punishment: Lock Up the Real Drug Dealers, 54 GONZ.
L. REV. 47, 63 (2018/19).
137. Tovino, supra note 132, at 909. For example, Dr. Jerrold Rosenberg received $188,000,
Dr. Gavin Awerburch received $138,435, Dr. John Couch received at least $100,000, and Dr.
Xiulu Ruan received $170,000. Id. at 909–12.
138. Gabrielle Manuel, Opioid Executive John Kapoor Found Guilty in Landmark Bribery
Case, WBEZ CHICAGO (May 2, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/711346081/
opioid-executive-john-kapoor-found-guilty-in-landmark-bribery-case.
139. See infra Part III.
140. Paul D. Rheingold, Fen-Phen and Redux: A Tale of Three Drugs, 34 TRIAL, Jan. 1998, at
78, 78; Jaime A. Wilsker, Note, One-Half Phen in the Morning/One Fen Before Dinner: A Proposal for FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 795, 824 n.133 (1998).
141. Teresa Curtin & Ellen Relkin, Preamble Preemption and the Challenged Role of Failure
to Warn and Defective Design Pharmaceutical Cases in Revealing Scientific Fraud, Marketing
Mischief, and Conflicts of Interest, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1773, 1783 (2007).
142. Robert K. Jenner, Rezulin: Fast Track to Failure, 36 TRIAL, July 2000, at 39, 45.
143. Van Cates et al., Recent Developments in Business Litigation, 55 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 193, 201–02 (2020).
144. Cynthia M. Ho, A Dangerous Concoction: Pharmaceutical Marketing, Cognitive Biases,
and First Amendment Overprotection, 94 IND. L.J. 773, 795 (2019).
145. Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market,
11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 472 (2017).
146. Phuong D. Nguyen, A Review of Average Wholesale Price Litigation and Comments on
the Medicare Modernization Act, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 249, 255, 257–58 (2006).
147. Curtin & Relkin, supra note 141, at 1783.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL104.txt

16

unknown

Seq: 16

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

11-FEB-22

13:52

[Vol. 71:1

have been accused of engaging in various unsavory practices.148 The
purpose of this analysis is not to rake up old scandals; rather, its purpose is to illustrate the pattern of misconduct that many pharmaceutical companies have engaged in from the 1950s to present day.
A. MER/29
One of the most notorious cases of fraudulent conduct during drug
testing involved MER/29, a prescription drug that was developed by
the Richardson-Merrell Company in the late 1950s to treat arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries) by reducing the level of cholesterol in
the blood.149 The drug’s active ingredient was triparanol.150 Before the
drug was first marketed, Richardson-Merrell and others conducted
246 experiments involving 3,907 animals and more than 2,000 human
subjects.151 However, some of this testing was falsified to hide the
drug’s harmful side effects.152
Richardson-Merrell’s Toxicology Department, headed by Knox
Smith, began testing MER/29 on laboratory rats in 1957.153 During the
first six-week test in which very high dosages of the drug were administered, all of the female rats died and all of them suffered abnormal
blood changes.154 A second test, using a lower dosage, also produced
abnormal blood changes in the rats; this information was sent to Dr.
Harold Werner, who was the company’s vice-president and director of
research.155 In 1958, William King, who replaced Smith as head of the
Toxicology Department, reviewed these blood change results.156
During 1958 and early 1959, the company conducted a test of MER/
29 on monkeys, which also produced abnormal blood changes.157
However, Dr. Van Maanen, head of the Biological Science Division,
which included the Toxicology Department, ordered a laboratory
148. Rheingold, supra note 140, at 78; Wilsker, supra note 140, at 824–25 (Fen-Phen); Curtin
& Relkin, supra note 141, at 1783 (Zyprexa); Jenner, supra note 142, at 45 (Rezulin); Van Cates
et al., supra note 143, at 201–02 (Celexa); Ho, supra note 144, at 795 (Bextra); Sarpatwari et al.,
supra note 145, at 472 (Tretinoin); Nguyen, supra note 146, at 257–58 (Zoladex); Curtin &
Relkin, supra note 141, at 1783 (Ortho Evra).
149. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1967). Arteriosclerosis,
or hardening of the arteries, may cause heart attacks or strokes. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (App. Ct. 1968).
150. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App. 1965).
151. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 835.
152. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403–05.
153. Id. at 404.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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technician to falsify these test results in a chart.158 This was done by
recording false body weights and extending the test records beyond
the dates after the monkeys had been killed and adding data for an
imaginary monkey that had never been part of the test.159 King later
revised a brochure prepared by Smith on the rat experiments that removed any mention of the abnormal blood results.160 These deletions
were approved by Dr. McMaster, who worked in the Medical Science
Division and who was in charge of all medical research on MER/29.161
In July 1959, Richardson-Merrell filed a new drug application
(NDA) with the FDA in order to secure permission to market the
drug.162 However, the application contained a number of false statements.163 Furthermore, although the drug was intended for long-term
use, at the time the NDA was submitted, only 116 human subjects had
taken MER/29 and none had used it for more than six months.164
When the FDA questioned the adequacy of this test data and demanded that additional studies be undertaken, Dr. Joseph Murray, the
company’s liaison officer, falsely stated that no blood changes had occurred in the tests on rats or monkeys, and that these tests had
demonstrated the safety of MER/29.165
Meanwhile, in January 1960, the company completed another rat
study in which “nine out of ten rats in the study developed eye opacities.”166 Once again, the company failed to tell the FDA about these
adverse results and instead reported that only eight out of twenty rats
had merely developed mild eye inflammations.167 In February 1960,
Richardson-Merrell informed the FDA of the results of MER/29 tests
on dogs but did not tell the agency that one of the dogs developed eye
opacities and blindness.168 The company also reported the results of
another test that it conducted on rats but failed to disclose that
158. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
159. Id. When the technician, Beulah Jordan, objected to King, she was told that because Van
Maanen was higher up, “[y]ou do as he tells you and be quiet.” Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. For example, the application claimed that only four out of eight rats had died in one
study when all of them had died. The application relied on wholly fictitious body weights and
organ weights. Also, blood tests were fabricated for dead rats to prove that they had continued
to live and take MER/29. In addition, the application failed to reveal the abnormal blood
changes that occurred in the experiments. False data was included on the monkey tests. Finally,
the false chart prepared by Ms. Jordan was included in the application. Id.
164. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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twenty-five of the thirty-six rats in the test had also developed eye
opacities.169
Two months later, the company received a report from Dr. Loretta
Fox who had conducted experiments on rats with MER/29 and had
observed lenticular and corneal eye opacities in the animals.170 When
the FDA asked the company to review Dr. Fox’s findings, William
King, the head of the Toxicology Department, replied that the drug
had been used on thousands of rats and only one group of animals had
experienced eye problems.171 King assured the FDA that they had “no
evidence from [their] experience or from the literature that MER/29
would in itself produce such changes.”172
In April 1961, Richardson-Merrell began another testing program
to determine the long-term effects of MER/29 on rats and dogs.173 By
June, some of the rats began to develop opacities in their eyes, and by
August, thirty-five out of forty-six rats had developed eye opacities.174
Notwithstanding the increasing evidence that MER/29 caused serious
eye problems in test animals, the company failed to provide the FDA
or medical professionals with this information and instead continued
to promote the drug aggressively.175 By October 1961, five of the
seven dogs in the test had developed opacities in their eyes.176 However, the company did not reveal this information to the FDA.177
Finally, in November 1961, the FDA asked the company to withdraw MER/29 from the market.178 In April 1962, the FDA made an
unannounced visit to the company’s laboratories and seized all
records of its animal experiments involving MER/29.179 Based on
these documents, the Justice Department obtained indictments
against Richardson-Merrell and three of its employees.180 All of the
defendants entered a plea of nolo contendere and paid a fine of
$80,000, the maximum fine allowed at that time.181
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
26, 26.
181.

Id.
Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
Id. at 405–06.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Paul D. Rheingold, Looking Back at the First Mass Drug Case, 50 TRIAL, Aug. 2014, at
Id.
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While the NDA for MER/29 was pending, Richardson-Merrell also
misled the medical profession by withholding information about the
risk of eye damage to patients.182 For example, Richardson-Merrell
invited a group of medical researchers to a conference in Princeton,
New Jersey to discuss MER/29.183 At this conference, King presented
a paper on the toxicology of MER/29184 but failed to mention that
abnormal blood changes had occurred in test animals, and he repeated
the false statements about the weights and dosages of MER/29 that
had been given to the monkeys in 1959.185
The president of Richardson-Merrell, Frank Getman, was aware of
this conference and later described it as “the most terrific selling tool
that Merrell has ever had.”186 When MER/29 was approved by the
FDA in April 1960, the company initiated “the greatest promotional
and advertising effort ever made [by it] in support of a product.”187
Notwithstanding adverse results from animal testing, one advertising
brochure declared that the drug was “virtually nontoxic and remarkably free from side effects even on prolonged clinical use.”188
Early in 1961, as reports of adverse reactions to MER/29 began to
reach Richardson-Merrell from researchers, doctors, and sales representatives, the company continued to claim that the drug was safe.189
Eventually, under pressure from the FDA, Richardson-Merrell withdrew MER/29 from the market.190 During the short time that MER/29
was on the market, it was administered to about 400,000 persons.191
At least 400 of them developed cataracts and other adverse conditions.192 Numerous lawsuits were brought against the company in the
aftermath of the MER/29 disaster and at least one of them resulted in
a substantial punitive damage award.193

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 405 (App. Ct. 1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
Id. at 406.
Rheingold, supra note 180, at 26.
Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr at 408.
Id.
Id. at 418.
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B. The Dalkon Shield IUD
The Dalkon Shield was an IUD invented by Dr. Hugh Davis and
Irwin Lerner.194 It consisted of a small piece of plastic195 which contained four phalanges on each side.196 It also contained a black string
that could be used to remove the device from the patient’s uterus.197
In 1968, Davis and Lerner established the Dalkon Corporation in order to produce and market Dalkon Shields.198 In February 1970, Dr.
Davis published the result of a study that he had conducted between
1968 and 1969 on 640 patients which concluded that the Dalkon
Shield’s pregnancy rate was only 1.1% per year.199 However, the
study’s methodology was deeply flawed.200 Moreover, no further testing was done on the product prior to its introduction into the market
because the FDA did not require such testing at that time.201
In June 1970, an employee of Robins informed the company that
the pregnancy rate of the Dalkon Shield was five times greater than
the rate claimed by Davis in his article.202 Nevertheless, Robins
bought the Dalkon Corporation and immediately began to market the
Dalkon Shield aggressively.203 To support its claim that the Dalkon
Shield was superior to other IUDs, Robins distributed hundreds of
thousands of reprints of the Davis article to physicians.204 The company also distributed Patient Information sheets which claimed that
the Dalkon Shield was a safe and effective method of birth control.205
In addition, Robins placed advertisements in newspapers and
magazines such as Family Circle, Mademoiselle, Ladies’ Home Jour194. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Dalkon Shield: A “Primer” in IUD Liability, 6 W. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 6 (1978).
195. Id. at 2 n.2.
196. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Kan. 1987).
197. Id.
198. Van Dyke, supra note 194, at 6.
199. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1216.
200. For example, although the study claimed that the Dalkon Shield’s pregnancy rate was
superior to that of other IUDs, Dr. Davis never actually tested any other IUDs. Id. at 1217. Also,
no control group was used in this test. Id. Furthermore, Dr. Davis did not disclose that he had a
substantial financial interest in the Dalkon corporation. See id. at 1216–17. Finally, Dr. Davis
failed to mention that the Dalkon Shields that were used in his study had been modified by the
time the study was published. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984).
201. Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices in
the United States, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 364 (1997).
202. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1217.
203. C. Gavin Shepherd, Transvaginal Mesh Litigation: A New Opportunity to Resolve Mass
Medical Device Failure Claims, 80 TENN. L. REV. 477, 485–86 (2013).
204. The reprint did not include the designation “Current Investigation,” which originally appeared in the article, and which would have warned readers that the Davis study was preliminary
and had not been proven to be scientifically valid. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1218.
205. Id.
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nal, Time, Glamour, Parade, and Cosmopolitan.206 This campaign was
very effective and by September 1972, the Dalkon Shield had captured 80% of the IUD market.207
However, reports of problems with the Dalkon Shield soon began
to emerge. For example, in December 1972, a Canadian doctor informed Robins that the failure rate for the Dalkon Shield was between 7% and 8%.208 That same month, a doctor at a military hospital
reported a pregnancy rate of 10%, which was far greater than the
1.1% claimed by Robins in its promotional materials.209
Not only were there reports that the Dalkon Shield was not as effective as claimed, but reports of serious medical problems also began
to pour in.210 These included reports of septic abortions, spontaneous
abortions, tubal pregnancies, perforations of the uterine wall, severe
pelvic infections, and even some deaths.211 Many of these injuries
were caused by the tendency of the tail string to transport bacterial
fluid by capillary action from the vagina to the uterus.212 Unlike other
IUDs, the Dalkon Shield’s tail string was a nylon-encased monofilament line which was not sealed at either end.213 Robins was aware of
this risk before it acquired the Dalkon Corporation, but it ignored the
concerns of its quality control personnel in order to save money.214
Instead of informing doctors about the danger of wicking, or trying to
correct it, Robins sought to assure doctors and consumers that the
IUD was safe.215
Eventually, in February 1974, Robins issued a “Dear Doctor” letter
which advised doctors to remove Dalkon Shields from any woman
who became pregnant.216 Later, at the request of the FDA, Robins
suspended future sales of the Dalkon Shield, while declaring in a press
release that “neither A.H. Robins nor the FDA has any reason at this
time to believe that women now using the Dalkon Shield successfully
should have the device removed.”217 However, even after Robins sus206. Id. at 1219.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1220 (Kan. 1987).
211. Trevor K. Scheetz, Note, Say What You Mean: The Discoverability of Medical Device
Adverse Event Reports, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2011).
212. Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making:
Greater Deterrence Through Strict Liability, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361, 1385 (1993).
213. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1221.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1220.
217. Id.
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pended sales in the United States, it continued to sell the Dalkon
Shield overseas.218
Finally, company officers ordered the destruction of many documents relating to the Dalkon Shield’s wicking problem.219 In 1975,
Roger Tuttle, a member of Robins’ legal department, was ordered to
collect and destroy these documents and was told that the order came
from the company’s president, W.L. Zimmer.220 According to Tuttle,
hundreds of documents were burned in a furnace, although Tuttle
secretly saved some copies.221
Not surprisingly, Robins was soon faced with a wave of lawsuits by
injured Dalkon Shield users.222 Although Robins won some of these
early lawsuits,223 the tide began to turn in 1985 when a Kansas jury
awarded a plaintiff $1.75 million in compensatory damages and $7.5
million in punitive damages.224 This verdict was later upheld on appeal.225 By this time, Robins and its liability insurer had paid almost
$530 million to injured consumers, and 5,000 additional claims were
still pending.226 As a result, Robins was eventually forced to file for
bankruptcy.227
C. Botox
Botox was approved by the FDA for adults to treat migraine headaches, muscle stiffness in the elbow, wrist and finger muscles, neck
pain associated with cervical dystonia, strabismus or blepharospasm,
severe underarm sweating, and severe lines between the eyebrows.228
However, Allergan, the manufacturer of Botox, decided to market the
product for the off-label treatment of pain and headaches even though
it was illegal for a drug company to promote off-label uses of its prod218. Law, supra note 201, at 365. Robins refused to pay for the cost of removing the Dalkon
Shield from existing users until October 1984. Id.
219. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1224 (Kan. 1987).
220. Id. at 1223–24.
221. Mabry, supra note 6, at 219.
222. Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1613, 1636 (2008).
223. Part of Robins’ defense strategy was to make the trial as unpleasant and expensive as
possible for the plaintiffs. Law, supra note 201, at 366. For example, company attorneys would
question victims about their sexual and hygienic habits. Id. They also asked them to identify their
sex partners so that they could question them about their medical histories. Id.
224. Shepherd, supra note 203, at 486.
225. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1210 (Kan. 1987).
226. Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why and The How, 78 AM
BANKR. L.J. 93, 112 (2004).
227. Shepherd, supra note 203, at 486.
228. James A. Robertson & Walter F. Timpone, Compliance Issues for Pharmaceutical and
Medical Device Manufacturers, ASPATORE, June 2014, at 14, 2014 WL 2355619.
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ucts.229 As part of its “CD/HA Initiative,” Allergan urged physicians
to diagnose cervical dystonia in their patients based on the existence
of pain or headache symptoms, even when no evidence of cervical
dystonia was present, so that they could prescribe Botox as
treatment.230
Allergan doubled the size of its reimbursement team to assist physicians in obtaining payment for off-label Botox injections and held
workshops to teach doctors how to bill for off-label uses to advise
them on how they could make money by injecting Botox.231 The company also operated a Botox Reimbursement Hotline which provided
an array of free on-demand services to physicians to encourage them
to prescribe Botox for off-label uses of the drug.232 In addition, Allergan held physician workshops and dinners that focused on off-label
uses and paid physicians to attend “advisory boards” that promoted
off-label uses.233 Finally, the company created an online neurotoxin
education organization to encourage the increased use of Botox for
off-label uses.234 Eventually, the federal government filed a criminal
information against Allergan for misbranding Botox.235 In 2010, the
company agreed to plead guilty and pay $600 million to resolve criminal and civil liability for off-label promotion of Botox.236
D. Neurontin
Neurontin was originally approved by the FDA for the adjunctive
treatment of epilepsy in doses ranging from 900 milligrams (mg) to
1800 mg per day.237 However, Parke-Davis, the drug’s manufacturer,
sought to increase the sales of this product by promoting it for offlabel uses, such as the treatment of bipolar disorder, migraines, and
neuropathic pain at dosages that exceeded the FDA-approved level of
229. Id.
230. 230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 15.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 15.
235. Id.
236. Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2010), https://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/business/02allergan.html.
237. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D. Mass. 2001). This
means that the drug was only to be used as a second-line defense for patients who were already
taking other anti-seizure medication. Neurontin was later also approved for the treatment of
shingles. Edward P. Lansdale, Note, Used as Directed? How Prosecutors Are Expanding the
False Claims Act to Police Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 159, 159 (2006).
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1800 mg per day, despite the fact that there was no evidence that these
unauthorized treatments were safe.238
According to the realtor,239 Parke-Davis allegedly used a number of
illegal tactics to promote off-label prescribing of the drug.240 For example, the company instructed its sales personnel to discuss off-label
uses in conversations with doctors when making sales calls.241 ParkeDavis also paired medical liaisons with sales representatives, misleading doctors into believing that these individuals were not salespeople,
but rather were there to provide objective scientific information.242
Parke-Davis also encouraged medical liaisons to instruct doctors on
how to conceal the fact that their prescriptions were for off-label purposes so that they would be eligible for reimbursement under Medicare. Parke-Davis paid doctors to travel to posh resorts to attend
“consultant” or “advisory” meetings that exclusively discussed off-label uses of Neurontin.243
Furthermore, the company subsidized the production and dissemination of reports that touted off-label uses but were of no scientific
value.244 In some cases, the company also edited the results of clinical
studies.245 Finally, Parke-Davis hosted a number of seminars and conferences that were supposed to deliver independent information regarding off-label uses of Neurontin.246 However, the company closely
controlled the organization of these seminars by determining their
content and choosing the speakers.247
These practices were very effective as shown by the fact that offlabel sales rose from 15% of total sales to 90% of sales after Parke238. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 652 (2014).
239. This case started out as a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act of 1863, 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by the relator, Dr. David Franklin, private citizen. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d
at 43.
240. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45–46.
241. George S. Craft, Jr., Note, Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a
Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH & POL’Y 103, 115 (2007).
242. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 281, 322 (2007).
243. Id.
244. Howard L. Dorfman & Linda Pissott Reig, Avoiding Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of Industry-Sponsored Research: The Co-Existence of Research, Scholarship, and Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 595, 598 (2004).
245. Jenny White & Lisa Bero, Corporate Manipulation of Research: Strategies Are Similar
Across Five Industries, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 128 (2010) (discussing company’s editing
of the Gorson Study).
246. Craft, supra note 241, at 116.
247. Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of
False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 113 (2008).
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Davis initiated its off-label use campaign.248 In dollar terms, sales of
Neurontin increased from $97.5 million in 1995 to approximately $2.7
billion in 2003.249
Eventually, the chickens came home to roost when federal regulators discovered the company’s fraudulent practices. In 2004, WarnerLambert, a division of Pfizer, which had acquired Parke-Davis, pled
guilty to charges of introducing a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce by providing inadequate labeling and introducing an unapproved drug into interstate commerce.250 Warner-Lambert settled the
case by agreeing to pay a $240 million criminal fine as well as $190
million in civil penalties.251 The company was also forced to implement a mandatory corporate compliance program.252
E. Lupron
Leuprolide acetate (Lupron) acts to suppress testosterone.253 It was
approved by the FDA in 1985 as a treatment for advanced prostate
cancer and was also prescribed to treat central precocious puberty.254
Lupron was marketed in the United States by TAP Pharmaceutical
Products, a joint venture between Abbott Laboratories and Takeda
Pharmaceutical Company.255
Because Lupron was designed to be administered by intramuscular
injection in daily or monthly doses, it was sold directly to doctors
rather than distributed to pharmacies.256 Furthermore, because
Lupron was intended to be administered under medical supervision,
much of the cost was paid by Medicare.257
TAP engaged in a number of questionable marketing practices to
encourage doctors to prescribe the drug. For example, the company
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute by offering physicians free drug
samples, volume discounts, free consulting services, and trips to ex248. Lansdale, supra note 237, at 186–87.
249. Greene, supra note 238, at 653.
250. Craft, supra note 241, at 116.
251. Id.
252. Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon Thyme Klinger, Lessons from Expanded Government
Enforcement Efforts Against Drug Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 9 (2005).
253. In re Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (D. Mass.
2003).
254. Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 176–77
(2018).
255. Lansdale, supra note 237, at 178–79.
256. In re Lupron, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
257. Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 125 (2009).
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pensive golf clubs and ski resorts.258 They also provided physicians
with “educational grants” to pay for cocktail parties, medical equipment, and travel expenses.259 In one case, when the Tufts Health
Maintenance Organization decided to treat cancer patients with
Zoldex, a cheaper competitor drug, TAP’s national accounts manager
offered to provide Tufts with unrestricted educational grants of up to
$25,000 per year for continuing to prescribe Lupron.260
Finally, the company also distributed thousands of free samples of
Lupron and encouraged physicians to bill Medicare for them.261 TAP
fraudulently reported Lupron’s average wholesale price, which was
the price upon which Medicare reimbursement was based, as much
higher than the price that physicians and others actually paid for the
drug.262 This enabled TAP to “spread the market,” the difference between the price the doctors paid for the drug and the amount of reimbursement that Medicare would provide.263
In 2001, TAP and eight of its executives were indicted for violating
the Prescription Drug Marketing Act and the Anti-Kickback Statute.264 TAP eventually pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $875 million
in criminal and civil penalties.265 It also agreed to implement a comprehensive seven-year corporate integrity agreement.266 The agreement required TAP to develop new marketing policies and procedures
to provide four hours of compliance training for marketing and sales
personnel and to obtain independent reviews of its sales and marketing practices.267 In addition, in 2005, TAP paid another $150 million to
settle a number of civil suits arising out of its marketing of Lupron.268

258. Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health
and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH
L. 235, 255 (2006).
259. John R. Washlick & Sidney Summers Welch, Physician-Vendor Marketing and Financial
Relationships Under Attack, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 151, 201 (2008).
260. In re Lupron, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 286. Ironically, AstraZeneca, the manufacturer of
Zoldex, was also charged with marketing violations. Nguyen, supra note 146, at 255.
261. Nguyen, supra note 146, at 253.
262. Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 252, at 8.
263. Lansdale, supra note 237, at 178.
264. Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 252, at 7–8.
265. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a ModernDay Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 359–60 (2010).
266. Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 252, at 8.
267. Washlick & Welch, supra note 259, at 202.
268. In re Lupron Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, MDL No. 1430, 2005 WL 1140553,
settlement approved (D. Mass. May 12, 2005).
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F. Vioxx
Merck began marketing Vioxx in 1999 to treat acute pain in adults,
including women suffering from menstrual pain.269 Vioxx belonged to
a class of substances known as COX-2 inhibitors.270 COX-2 inhibitors
impede the production of the enzyme cyclooxygenase-2, which can
cause pain and inflammation.271 At the same time, Vioxx did not inhibit the production of COX-1, an enzyme which helps to protect the
stomach lining.272 Therefore, Vioxx reduced pain but did not cause
some of the gastrointestinal problems that occurred with ibuprofen or
naproxen (Aleve).273 Although Vioxx was a prescription drug, Merck
relied heavily on direct-to-consumer advertising to promote it.274 The
drug was an immediate success.275
Prior to FDA approval of Vioxx in 1999, Merck funded a study by
independent researchers known as the Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) Study Group.276 Although the study was to
be a double-blind randomized trial to compare the occurrence of gastrointestinal toxicity of Vioxx and naproxen, it was actually designed
by the company’s marketing department to boost sales.277 Over 8,000
patients participated in the study.278 On one hand, the VIGOR Study
showed that while Vioxx and naproxen were both effective painkillers,
Vioxx caused only about half the number of serious gastrointestinal
problems as naproxen.279 On the other hand, the VIGOR Study also
found that that the incidence of myocardial infarction (MI), irreversible heart damage typically resulting from blockage of a coronary ar269. Walter T. Champion, A Tale of Two Cities: A Commentary on the Media’s Response to
Personal Injury “Feeding Frenzies” as a Result of the Vioxx and Silicosis Litigation, 31 WHITTIER
L. REV. 47, 50 (2009).
270. Green, supra note 118, at 751.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Walter T. Champion, The Vioxx Litigation Paradigm: The Search for Smoking Guns, 31
THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 158 n. 7 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism
in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. &
ETHICS 741, 766 (2005).
274. See generally Marshall H. Chin, The Patient’s Role in Choice of Medications: Direct-toConsumer Advertising and Patient Decision Aids, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 771,
772 (2005).
275. Champion, supra note 269, at 50.
276. Green, supra note 118, at 752.
277. Mona Ghogomu, Comment, When Does the Chain Break? Prescribing Around Drug
Manufacturer Fraud, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 557, 572–73 (2018).
278. Green, supra note 118, at 752.
279. Id. at 753.
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tery, was five times higher among patients in the Vioxx group than the
naproxen group.280
Although Merck knew that Vioxx was a dangerous drug, the company downplayed these risks and marketed the drug aggressively.281
One of the items that was distributed to its salespeople was a tri-fold
brochure known as a “Cardiovascular Card,” which featured data
from several earlier studies that supported the claim that Vioxx was
safer than competing products.282 However, these were short-term
pre-approval studies that were based on very limited populations and
were not always concerned with identifying cardiovascular effects.283
Consequently, they were of limited scientific value.284
Merck was also accused of trying to suppress or edit adverse studies
about Vioxx.285 For example, FDA scientist Dr. David Graham was
forced to withdraw an article which was to be published by the English medical journal, The Lancet.286 The Graham study of 1.4 million
patients indicated that low doses of Vioxx increased the risk of heart
disease by about 5%, while higher doses increased the risk by 35%.287
Graham later testified that he was ordered to withdraw the paper or
face “severe consequences.”288
In another case, Merck hid an unpublished study that showed an
increased risk of cardiovascular problems with the use of Vioxx.289 In
addition, editors of the New England Journal of Medicine accused
Merck of deleting data about three heart attacks observed in the
VIGOR Study before submitting its results to the journal.290 Furthermore, Merck threatened that a Stanford University researcher would
“flame out” unless he stopped giving anti-Merck lectures.291 Finally,
Merck urged Cleveland Clinic’s Medical College to demote Dr. Eric
Topol, a prominent cardiologist, for questioning Vioxx’s safety.292
280. Id. However, the group within the study population that was most affected by MI was
largely confined to the 4% of the study population for whom low-dose aspirin had been prescribed. Id. Aspirin was withheld during the study to prevent its influencing the results. Id.
281. Culp & Berry, supra note 117, at 3.
282. Green, supra note 118, at 756.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Culp & Berry, supra note 117, at 27.
286. Champion, supra note 273, at 165.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 166.
291. Id. at 170.
292. Champion, supra note 273, at 171.
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In 2000, Merck sponsored another large long-term clinical trial involving 2,600 subjects.293 This study, known as the Adenomatous
Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVE) trial, was designed to evaluate the ability of Vioxx to prevent the recurrence of colorectal polyps
in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas.294 However, the trial
was abruptly terminated in September 2004, when researchers found
that there was a significantly increased risk of heart attacks and
strokes after eighteen months of treatment for patients taking Vioxx
compared with those taking a placebo.295 The results of this study
eventually led Merck to take Vioxx off the market.296 In addition, one
of Merck’s subsidiaries paid a $950 million fine to the federal
government.297
More than 80 million persons worldwide took Vioxx for pain relief
during the five-year period between 1999 and 2004.298 Dr. Graham
estimates that Vioxx may have caused 140,000 heart attacks or strokes
and 55,000 deaths in the United States alone.299 After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market, a large number of plaintiffs brought civil
suits against the company in federal and states courts; most of the federal cases were eventually transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana for consolidation under the federal multidistrict litigation
statute.300 Eventually, the parties settled in most of these cases under
which Merck agreed to place $4.85 billion into a fund for heart attack
and stroke victims.301
G. Paxil
Paxil is a form of antidepressant known as a selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) or serotonin blocker drug.302 It was developed to treat SAD, or social phobia, which was characterized by a
marked and persistent fear of social or performance situations.303 At
first, doctors assumed that SAD was relatively rare, but in the 1990s, a
293. Id. at 186.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Culp & Berry, supra note 117, at 2.
297. McCarthy, supra note 5, at 453.
298. Culp & Berry, supra note 117, at 4.
299. Id.
300. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.D.R. 450, 452 (E.D. La. 2006).
301. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265, 279 (2011).
302. Cohan, supra note 107, at 117.
303. Fish, supra note 127, at 235.
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study estimated that this condition was massively underdiagnosed and
might be as common as depression.304
In order to introduce Paxil, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), the product’s
manufacturer, put together a group of several nonprofit organizations
that launched a sophisticated campaign to increase public awareness
about SAD.305 “Hundreds of stories about SAD appeared in the public media.”306 Although no drugs were mentioned by name, this effort
persuaded doctors and the public that SAD could be successfully
treated by drug therapy.307 After the FDA approved Paxil for SAD in
1999, GSK sponsored a series of ads that promoted Paxil in social situations that predictably evoked fear in many people, such as dinner
parties and speaking engagements.308 According to one commentator,
“Paxil became one of the ten most prescribed pharmaceuticals, supplanting Zoloft as the second best-selling SSRI.”309
In June 2003, a British researcher reported that teenagers and children were 3.2 times as likely to have suicidal thoughts or attempt suicide when given Paxil as compared with those test subjects who were
given a placebo.310 However, only one of these trial results was made
available to the medical community.311 That study concluded that
Paxil was generally well-tolerated and was effective for major depression in adolescents.312
On June 2, 2004, the New York Attorney General filed suit in state
court alleging that GSK promoted the use of Paxil in adolescents and
children despite the fact that the drug was not approved by the FDA
for this class of patients.313 The suit also declared that GSK suppressed four studies that failed to confirm that Paxil was effective in
treating children and adolescents for depression and also implied that
it might cause an increase in suicidal ideation.314 The Attorney General relied heavily on a report by GSK that two studies had cast
doubts about Paxil’s effectiveness.315 As a result, the company de304. Id.
305. Id. at 235–36.
306. Id. at 236.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Fish, supra note 127, at 236.
310. Cohan, supra note 107, at 144; Evans, supra note 106, at 70.
311. Evans, supra note 106, at 70.
312. Id.
313. Dorfman & Reig, supra note 244, at 595.
314. Aisling V. O’Sullivan, Comment, Walking a Fine Line: Are SSRIs Really Depression
Wonder Drugs or Threats to Patient Safety?, 26 PACE L. REV. 549, 568–69 (2006).
315. Dorfman & Reig, supra note 244, at 597.
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cided to effectively manage the dissemination of this information in
order to minimize any potential negative commercial impact.316
GSK eventually agreed to a scheduled release of negative data on
the safety and effectiveness of Paxil and agreed to pay $2.5 million to
the state.317 GSK also pled guilty to a three-count criminal indictment
in federal court for introducing misbranded drugs, including Paxil, and
agreed to pay a $3 billion fine for engaging in kickbacks and fraudulent marketing of the drug.318
The FDA conducted a study on suicidal ideation, known as the Columbia Study, which combined data from twenty-four smaller studies
on adolescents and children.319 This study showed that about 4% of
test subjects who took antidepressants became suicidal, compared
with 2% of those who took a placebo.320 This led the FDA to require
that all SSRI drugs be labeled with a black box warning.321
H. OxyContin
The current opioid epidemic is a serious public health problem.322
Since 1999, opioids, including illegal street drugs, have killed about
400,000 people in the United States.323 According to one source, between 2013 and 2017, about 2.1 million Americans were addicted to
opioids and over 4 million persons misused opioids each month.324
Furthermore, prescription drug abuse often leads to the use of heroin
and other illegal street drugs.325 Although opioid addiction is particularly acute in economically depressed areas such as Appalachia, it is a
nationwide problem.326 The opioid epidemic also has severe economic
consequences. For example, the Council of Economic Advisors has
316. Id.
317. Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 252, at 11; O’Sullivan, supra note 314, at 569.
318. McCarthy, supra note 101, at 45.
319. Timothy J. Hixson, Note, Anti-Depressants and Children: Suicidality, Off-Label Use, and
Trial Publication, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 201, 207–08 (2006).
320. Id. at 208–09.
321. O’Sullivan, supra note 314, at 567; Hixson, supra note 319, at 209.
322. Wellesley Anna DuBois, Healthcare’s Biggest Little Lie: Rampant Hospital Drug Diversion Hidden Behind Stethoscopes and White Coats, 18 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 2, 4 (2020).
323. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation:
Lessons from Tobacco and Opioids, 73 STAN. L. REV. 285, 287 (2021).
324. LAWRENCE SCHOLL ET AL., Drug and Opioid Involved Overdose Deaths—United States,
2013-2017, 67 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1419 (2019).
325. McCoy, supra note 136, at 56.
326. Ashley Duckworth, Note, Fighting America’s Best-Selling Product: An Analysis of the
Solution to the Opioid Crisis, 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 237, 246 (2019).
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estimated that the annual economic cost of opioid abuse is $500
billion.327
The opioid addiction epidemic can be traced to the introduction of
OxyContin by Purdue Pharma.328 OxyContin is a narcotic prescription
pain reliever whose active ingredient is oxycodone hydrochloride.329 It
was developed by Purdue Pharma and first marketed in 1996.330 Although OxyContin was twice as powerful as morphine, it was touted
as superior to other opioids because of a time-release mechanism
which allowed a higher dose to be released over a twelve-hour period
of time, instead of the more common four- to six-hour period.331 In
order to persuade doctors to prescribe OxyContin for the treatment of
chronic pain, Purdue embarked on a comprehensive and sophisticated
marketing campaign.332
At one time, the accepted practice among the medical profession
was to avoid using opioids to treat chronic pain and limit it to the
treatment of short-term acute pain.333 However, in the 1980s, a growing number of pain specialists claimed that chronic pain was undertreated.334 Relying on this surge in interest in pain treatment, Purdue
sought to greatly increase the market for OxyContin by persuading
doctors to prescribe it for the treatment of non-malignant chronic
pain.335 In order to change existing prescribing practices, Purdue and
other opioid manufacturers assured doctors that opioids were effective for treating moderate chronic pain and that the risk of addiction
was not significant.336
Purdue communicated these assurances to healthcare providers by
direct advertising and during office visits by their sales representatives.337 The company also engaged in unbranded advertising by fund327. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1, 1
(2017).
328. Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 323, at 307–08.
329. Frederickson, supra note 257, at 132.
330. QUINONES, supra note 128, at 134.
331. Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement: How the OxyContin Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May Make Pharmaceutical Companies
Liable for Black Markets, 100 N.W. U. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2006).
332. Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 323, at 307–08.
333. QUINONES, supra note 128, at 80.
334. Sarpatwari et al., supra note 145, at 465.
335. Nino C. Monea, Cities v. Big Pharma: Municipal Affirmative Litigation in Response to the
Opioid Crisis, 50 URB. LAW. 87, 103–04 (2019).
336. Lars Noah, Federal Regulatory Responses to the Prescription Opioid Crisis: Too Little,
Too Late?, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 757, 766 (2019).
337. Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061, 1065
(2019).
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ing seemingly independent key opinion leaders and organizations who
echoed these assurances in medical and scientific journals and at continuing medical education programs.338
The company also encouraged physicians to prescribe OxyContin
for the treatment of chronic pain by treating them to all-expense-paid
conferences at exotic resorts and provided them with pain-related educational programs.339 In addition, Purdue mailed thousands of promotional materials to physicians and paid substantial bonuses to its
sales staff.340 Furthermore, the company also provided doctors with
OxyContin starter vouchers and coupons to give to their patients and
also gave them logo-branded fishing hats, tote bags, clocks, stuffed
toys, and compact discs as additional incentives to prescribe
OxyContin.341
Additionally, opioid manufacturers told doctors that symptoms of
addiction that they might have observed were not evidence of actual
addiction but rather were symptoms of “pseudoaddiction,” a condition that was caused by undertreated pain that required higher doses
of opioids.342 In addition, Purdue and others falsely claimed that
opioids could be safely prescribed for patients who were susceptible to
addiction because screening, counseling, and drug testing would enable doctors to detect addiction before it became a serious problem.343
Furthermore, drug companies claimed that their products were safer
than non-opioid pain relievers, such as non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.344 Finally, opioid manufacturers targeted primary care
physicians who were unlikely to be familiar with the addiction risk of
opioids for the treatment of chronic pain.345
This marketing campaign was very successful.346 Within a few years
of its introduction into the market, OxyContin became the nation’s
most highly prescribed Schedule II prescription drug.347 Between 1996
338. Monea, supra note 335, at 103–04; Taylor Giancarlo, Note, Pharmaceutical Advertising
Disclosures: Is Less Really More?, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 449, 467–68 (2019).
339. Duckworth, supra note 326, at 257.
340. Id. at 257–58.
341. Id. at 258.
342. Christine Minhee & Steve Calandrillo, The Cure for America’s Opioid Crisis? End the
War on Drugs, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547, 560–61 (2019).
343. Paul L. Keenan, Death by 1000 Lawsuits: The Public Litigation in Response to the Opioid
Crisis Will Mirror the Global Tobacco Settlement of the 1990s, 52 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69, 72
(2017).
344. City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063–73 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
345. ERIC EYRE, DEATH IN MUD LICK 13 (2020).
346. Sarpatwari et al., supra note 145, at 467.
347. Dianne E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
231, 273 (2008).
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and 2019, Purdue made an estimated $35 billion from the sale of
OxyContin.348
As the addiction crisis grew at the beginning of the twenty-first century, injured parties brought numerous lawsuits against Purdue and
other opioid manufacturers.349 In general, these lawsuits were unsuccessful, although the cost of defending against them was significant.350
Eventually, Purdue and its top executives were charged with criminal
violations by the Department of Justice.351 The company and its officers pled guilty to these charges and paid more than $600 million in
fines and civil penalties.352
On the civil side, the tide began to turn against Purdue and other
drug companies in 2014 when a number of cities, counties, and states
filed lawsuits against them, based on public nuisance and other liability theories.353 Most of these cases were transferred to federal courts,
although state plaintiffs were able to keep their cases in state
courts.354 Recently, one such case was tried in a bench trial in an
Oklahoma trial court.355 This resulted in a damages award against
Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary, Janssen, for $572 million.356
However, the lower court’s judgment was reversed on November 9,
2021.357
By late 2017, thousands of such cases had been brought into federal
court, prompting the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
to transfer all of the pending federal cases to Judge Dan Polster in the
348. Benjamin Soskis, Why Haven’t Major Institutions Cut Ties with the Sackler Family?
WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-havent-major-institutions-cut-ties-with-the-sackler-family/2019/03/15/6b06d2ec-4102-11e9-a0d31210e58a94cf_story.html.
349. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription
Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1122–38 (2014).
350. By the end of 2004, Purdue had spent $250 million defending against lawsuits by injured
consumers. Frederickson, supra note 257, at 134.
351. United States v. Purdue Frederick, Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (W.D. Va. 2007).
352. Andrew E. Lelling, Corporate Accountability for the Opioid Epidemic, 66 U.S. ATTY.
BULL. 159, 166 (July 2018).
353. Richard C. Ausness, The Current State of Opioid Litigation, 70 S.C. L. REV. 565, 566
(2019).
354. Attorneys General in forty-nine states have brought suits against opioid manufacturers
and others in state courts. Lance Gable, Preemption and Privatization in the Opioid Litigation,
13 NE. U. L. REV. 297, 312 (2012).
355. Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. C1-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist.
LEXIS 3486, at *1 (Aug. 26, 2019).
356. Duckworth, supra note 326, at 261–62. This was later reduced to $465 million to correct a
mathematical error. Justin Kaufman, Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma: Public Nuisance in Your
Medicine Cabinet, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 429, 429 n.5 (2020).
357. See State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 118,474, 2021 WL 5191372, at *11
(Okla. Nov. 9, 2021).
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Northern District of Ohio.358 In addition, other lawsuits brought by
hospitals, Indian tribes, healthcare plans, and neonatal abstinence syndrome babies are also pending at the time of this writing.359 Meanwhile, Purdue, one of the most significant contributors to the opioid
crisis, filed for bankruptcy in September 2019 and, most likely, will no
longer participate in the MDL process.360
IV.

FACTORS

THAT

INFLUENCE CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

The foregoing examples suggest that corporate misconduct has become the business model of choice for many pharmaceutical companies.361 The conditions that encourage or facilitate improper behavior
include: (1) weak or ineffective regulation by the FDA and other government agencies; (2) an excessive focus on short-term profits fueled
by external market conditions, the nature of the corporate structure,
and internal compensation practices; and (3) the existence of a toxic
culture within many pharmaceutical companies that tolerates unethical conduct.362
A. Weak Governmental Regulation
Virtually all pharmaceutical products, including prescription drugs,
medical devices, and over-the-counter drugs, are regulated by the
FDA under the provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.363
FDA regulations cover the entire lifecycle of a drug from the beginning stages of development to its use after approval.364 Unfortunately,
the FDA’s regulatory regime is not always as effective as it could be.
Weaknesses are present throughout the entire regulatory process, including clinical testing, marketing to physicians, direct-to-consumer
advertising, control over the promotion of off-label uses, and the monitoring of post-approval adverse events.365
One concern is the process by which new drugs are tested prior to
FDA approval. Drug companies typically hire for-profit institutions to
conduct clinical studies of prescription drugs and often try to influence
358. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378–79 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
359. Erich Eiselt, The Opioid Wars—Notes from the Front, 60 MUNICIPAL LAW. Sept.-Oct.
2019, at 24, 25.
360. Samantha T. Pannier, Litigating an Epidemic: California Plaintiffs in the National Opioid
Litigation, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 295–96 (2020).
361. McCoy, supra note 136, at 65.
362. See supra Part III.
363. 21 U.S.C. §§ 300–99 (2021).
364. Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 858–59 (2017).
365. See supra Part II.A.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL104.txt

36

unknown

Seq: 36

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

11-FEB-22

13:52

[Vol. 71:1

the design of these studies in order to ensure a favorable outcome.366
Moreover, in the past, pharmaceutical companies have been accused
of manipulating test data or providing ghostwritten reports of these
studies to scientific journals in order to encourage doctors to prescribe
their products.367
The FDA’s drug approval process is also not without its problems.
The FDA has been accused of setting too low a bar for drug approvals.368 For example, the FDA authorized Eli Lilly, the product’s manufacturer, to market its antidepressant, Prozac, in a “one size fits all”
high-dosage formulation even though company scientists recommended a lower dose regimen because of concerns about the increased risk of harmful side effects from the higher dosage pills.369 In
addition, the FDA has sometimes approved new drugs even though
safety issues had arisen in connection with similar drugs.370 For example, the FDA continued to approve oxycodone-based opioids long after the experience with OxyContin showed these opioids were
extremely addictive.371 Labeling can also be a problem. In one instance, the FDA allowed Purdue to claim that OxyContin was less
likely than other opioids to be misused by patients because of its
timed-release formula when this was untrue.372 To make matters
worse, FDA-approved labeling unintentionally told users how to defeat the timed-release mechanism by telling them not to crush the
tablets.373
The FDA also oversees advertising, marketing, and promotional
materials in order to ensure that drug companies provide accurate and
truthful information about their products.374 However, the FDA
rarely sanctions drug companies for serious marketing violations.375
Moreover, because the FDA only regulates marketing materials that
promote a branded product, drug companies can circumvent oversight
regulation by disseminating materials that relate to a class of drugs
366. McCarthy, supra note 101, at 46–49.
367. Cohan, supra note 107, at 161.
368. Melissa Marie Bean, Comment & Note, Fatal Flaws in the Food and Drug Administration
Drug-Approval Formula, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 881, 891–92 (2003).
369. Id. at 122.
370. Noah, supra note 336, at 760–62.
371. Duckworth, supra note 326, at 270.
372. QUINONES, supra note 128, at 126.
373. Id.
374. Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 102 (2002).
375. Anna Stapleton, Comment, In Defense of the Hare: Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and
Scientific Uncertainty in State Court Opioid Litigation, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1697, 1701 (2019).
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rather than a particular branded product.376 Drug companies engaged
in this practice extensively when they promoted opioids for the treatment of chronic pain without advertising their own products by
name.377
Another area of concern is direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising.
Drug companies now spend $5 billion annually to promote their products directly to consumers.378 The relaxed restrictions on DTC advertising encourage drug companies to develop and promote products
which are aimed at large numbers of potential consumers who suffer
from chronic (but not life-threatening) conditions such as erectile dysfunction, asthma, indigestion, or insomnia.379 Not only does the prospect of capturing a share of a large and profitable market induce drug
companies to focus on producing incremental improvements to existing lifestyle drugs instead of developing more useful products, in
some cases, as the Vioxx case illustrates, but it also causes them to
ignore evidence of potential adverse reactions.380
The FDA’s efforts to prevent drug companies from promoting offlabel uses of prescription drugs also need to be improved. Off-label
uses are uses that have not been subjected to clinical trials and, therefore, are not approved by the FDA.381 Generally speaking, doctors
may legally prescribe drugs for off-label uses, and medical professionals may encourage others to do so as well.382 However, drug companies are not allowed to promote or advocate off-label uses for their
products.383 That being said, the market for off-label uses in some
cases is sometimes greater than the market for approved uses,384 so
drug companies may be tempted to ignore the FDA’s prohibition of
such uses.385 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the penalties
376. Id.
377. Monea, supra note 335, at 103–04.
378. McCoy, supra note 136, at 82.
379. Green, supra note 118, at 751.
380. Id. at 751.
381. Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Prescription and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 187–88 (1999).
382. Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA OffLabel Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 9 (2007).
383. John N. Joseph et al., Enforcement Related to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs and
devices: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 78
(2009).
384. Michael I. Krauss, Essay, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly: Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 472 (1996) (estimating
that between 20% and 60% of all prescriptions are for off-label uses).
385. Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777–79 (1996).
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imposed for violating the prohibition against promotion of off-label
prescribing are not always sufficient to deter this practice.386
The FDA also needs to strengthen its post-marketing oversight.
Premarket tests cannot detect many of the risks that may surface
when a new drug is approved.387 To be sure, drug manufacturers are
required to gather information about adverse events and report them
to the FDA.388 In addition, under some circumstances, the FDA can
ask or require a drug company to conduct post-market tests on approved drugs.389 However, this power is limited. In the case of a drug
that has already been approved for marketing, the FDA can only order additional testing based on new safety information.390 Furthermore, the FDA can only order the drug company to conduct a new
clinical study if it concludes that other existing studies are insufficient.391 Thus, the agency is often slow to recognize and react to evidence of serious side effects caused by some of the drugs that it has
approved.392
B. Economic Factors
Various economic factors promote misconduct by pharmaceutical
companies. These can be attributed to the corporate structure, external market forces, or a corporation’s internal promotion and compensation practices.393
1. Corporate Structure
To some analysts, corporate misconduct is a product, at least in part,
of the legal structure of corporate entities.394 A fundamental aspect of
the corporate structure is the separation of ownership and manage386. Hannah Smoot Combs, Note, Striking a Balance: Ensuring the Safety and Efficacy of a
Drug’s Use, While Recognizing the First Amendment Protection of Truthful, Non-Misleading OffLabel Drug Communications, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 424, 433 (2016). For a list of cases involving off-label promotion and other violations see Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 42 n.9 (2005).
387. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L.& ETHICS 587, 598–99 (2005).
388. Mary J. Davis, Time for a Fresh Look at Strict Liability for Pharmaceuticals, CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 405 (2019) (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o)(3) (West 2013)).
389. Cahoy, supra note 105, at 633–34.
390. Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 960–61 (2007).
391. Id. at 961.
392. Jillian Clare Cohen-Kohler & Laura Esmail, Scientific Misconduct, the Pharmaceutical
Industry, and the Tragedy of Institutions, 26 MED. & L. 431, 435 (2007) (discussing the FDA’s
failure to respond to concerns about Vioxx).
393. See infra Part IV.B.
394. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 813 (2004).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL104.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 39

CORPORATE MISCONDUCT

11-FEB-22

13:52

39

ment.395 Shareholders are the owners of the corporation, the board of
directors makes major decisions, and corporate officers run the dayto-day operations of the business.396 However, this aspect of the corporate structure weakens responsibility for decision-making. Shareholders exercise control through their power to elect the board of
directors and to approve matters such as mergers and charter amendments.397 In theory, shareholders can discipline corporate officers
through derivative lawsuits; however, these are expensive and
burdensome.398
Likewise, directors can exercise control over corporate officers by
removing those who engage in wrongdoing.399 However, in reality, directors delegate most managerial responsibilities to corporate officers,
and they often lack either the incentive or capacity to monitor their
officers.400 In addition, for-profit corporations are formed for the purpose of making money for shareholders, and the interests of other
stakeholders are generally marginalized.401 Instead, corporate managers are often pressured by investors and market forces to think in
terms of short-term gains at the expense of longer-term interests.402
2. External Market Forces
According to most commentators, the primary function of corporate management is to maximize profit for the benefit of shareholders.403 However, this objective may also encourage management to
focus on increasing short-term profits even if that means engaging in
risky or unethical conduct.404 This demand for short-term results
comes from a wide variety of shareholders, including day traders, mutual funds, insurance companies, private pension funds, foundations,
and university endowments.405 Shareholders, such as pension plans,
which depend upon capital markets to enable them to maintain ex395. Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 359
(2016).
396. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (2006).
397. Id. at 1440.
398. Shaner, supra note 395, at 383.
399. Corporate officers serve at the pleasure of the board of directors. Id. at 404.
400. Id. at 383.
401. Acevedo, supra note 38, at 655.
402. Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 295–96 (2012).
403. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).
404. David Million, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 915–16
(2013).
405. Id. at 913.
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isting benefit levels, often exert pressure to keep profits and stock
prices high.406 In addition, because patent protection for drugs is relatively short, pharmaceutical companies often feel the pressure to introduce drugs to the market quickly and promote them aggressively
before patent protection runs out and they face competition from
cheaper generic equivalents.407 Competition from similar pharmaceutical products sometimes induces companies to engage in unethical or
illegal sales practices.408
3. Financial Incentives and Cultural Norms within the Company
In most companies, senior management determines the nature of
corporate culture, and this in turn influences the behavior of lowerlevel employees.409 Thus, if senior officers and managers call for profits at any price or engage in shady or reckless practices, this conduct
will undoubtedly affect the conduct of lower-level employees, including sales personnel.410
In addition, lower-level employees are often subjected to “stretch”
goals or other policies that are aggressive or unethical.411 For example,
pharmaceutical companies created an incentive structure that encouraged sales representatives to encourage doctors to prescribe
drugs inappropriately.412
Another phenomenon that sometimes occurs is an excessive sense
of loyalty to the company. In such an environment, being a “team
player” and one who is loyal to the company is highly valued in many
organizations.413 As the Vioxx experience demonstrates, this cultural
norm can sometimes cause employees to go along with policies or decisions that they know are wrong.414
406. Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under
Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 394 (2014).
407. Ho, supra note 144, at 795.
408. See, e.g., Zalesky, supra note 258, at 255 (discussing how competition between the makers of Lupron and Zoladex caused them both to violate the Anti-Kickback Act).
409. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 599–600 (2005).
410. Id.
411. Donald Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to
the Psychology, Culture, and the Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1230
(2011).
412. For example, some of Purdue’s sales representatives received bonuses of up to $240,000
for encouraging doctors to write more prescriptions for OxyContin. Roseann B. Termini, 50
Years Post-Controlled Substances Act: The War on Drugs Rages on with Opioids at the Forefront,
46 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2020).
413. Culp & Berry, supra note 117, at 31.
414. Id.
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V. SOLUTIONS
Unfortunately, corporate misconduct is a longstanding and pervasive practice among pharmaceutical companies.415 For this reason, I
do not propose any sort of “magic bullet” but instead suggest a number of responses which, taken together, may have a beneficial effect.
These proposals are for the FDA to: (1) develop more effective regulation over prescription drugs; (2) create economic incentives to discourage unethical behavior within the pharmaceutical industry; and
(3) implement policies to change the current culture within the
industry.
Part IV identified a number of areas where government regulation
of pharmaceutical products could be strengthened.416 For example,
the FDA needs to exercise more oversight and control over the preapproval clinical testing process so that harmful or ineffective drugs
are not approved. In addition, the FDA should be given more power
to respond promptly to adverse reaction reports and, if necessary, suspend the sale of drugs when safety concerns are raised. Furthermore,
the FDA should ensure that approved warnings and other labeling are
scientifically accurate and that they fully disclose all of a drug’s serious
risks.
The FDA also needs to regulate promotion and marketing activities
by pharmaceutical companies more strictly. This includes prohibiting,
or at least discouraging, the publication of ghostwritten articles regarding their products in medical and scientific journals. The FDA
should also monitor branded advertising, particularly DTC advertising, to ensure that safety issues are fully disclosed.
Furthermore, the FDA should exercise more control over unbranded advertising. In particular, the agency should intervene when a
drug company places misleading or fraudulent statements on its website, supports front groups for the purpose of touting its products, or
pays speakers to act on its behalf without disclosure at professional
conferences and events. The FDA should also aggressively search for
and punish companies that unlawfully promote off-label uses of their
products. Finally, the FDA should monitor the practices of sales representatives to ensure that they provide physicians with full and accurate information about the risks associated with their products.
Of course, there is no assurance that any of these proposals will
actually be implemented. The pharmaceutical industry has a powerful
lobby, and no doubt has sufficient political power to oppose any seri415. See supra Part II, notes 289–338.
416. See supra Part IV, notes 365–90.
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ous attempt by Congress to increase the FDA’s regulatory
authority.417
As described earlier, corporations, including pharmaceutical companies, are motivated by profits and other economic incentives which
sometimes encourage them to act irresponsibly.418 Therefore, any response to this problem must include a range of financial measures to
deter unwanted conduct.
One option is to increase the criminal and civil penalties imposed
on companies that violate laws and regulations.419 Although pharmaceutical companies have paid millions of dollars in fines, civil penalties, and settlements, apparently these sanctions are not always
sufficient to deter them from engaging in further misconduct.420
For example, Eli Lilly paid the federal government $1.415 billion in
2009 for promoting off-label uses of its antipsychotic drug, Zyprexa.421
In comparison, for several years, annual sales of the drug amounted to
$4.2 billion.422 Similarly, Pfizer paid a whopping $2.3 billion fine for
illegally marketing its painkiller, Bextra, but that amount allegedly
amounted to less than three weeks of sales revenue from the drug.423
GSK paid a $3 billion fine in connection with its promotion of Paxil
but reputedly made $12 billion from sales of the drug.424 Although
Warner-Lambert paid the federal government a $240 million criminal
fine and $190 million in civil penalties for promoting off-label uses of
Neurontin,425 sales of that drug during the previous year were approximately $2.7 billion.426 Finally, Purdue paid more than $600 million in
fines and civil penalties to settle a case against it for “misbranding”
OxyContin.427 However, OxyContin sales generated an estimated $30
billion in revenue for the company between 1996 and 2019.428
Corporate compliance agreements are another tool that could be
strengthened by making them longer in duration, more comprehen417. W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would It Have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 376 (2006).
418. See supra Part I, notes 6-88.
419. McCoy, supra note 136, at 69–70.
420. Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury
Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1051, 1054 (2007).
421. David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate, 42 CONN. L. REV. 733, 737 (2010).
422. Curtin & Relkin, supra note 141, at 1784.
423. Ho, supra note 144, at 795.
424. McCarthy, supra note 5, at 454.
425. In re Neurontin Mtg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2013); see also
Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 252, at 9.
426. Greene, supra note 238, at 653.
427. Frederickson, supra note 257, at 138.
428. Duckworth, supra note 326, at 260.
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sive in scope, and more closely supervised by the regulatory agency.
Some commentators have suggested that corporate officers should be
held civilly, and even criminally, liable for allowing their companies to
engage in illegal conduct.429
Arguably, corporate misconduct may also be deterred by the threat
of civil litigation.430 In general, personal injury actions by private individuals are problematic.431 For example, of the hundreds of lawsuits
that were brought against the manufacturers of SSRI drugs, most were
either settled or dismissed.432 Only one such case, Estates of Tobin v.
SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, resulted in a verdict for the
plaintiff.433 However, it should be noted that the possibility of recovering punitive damages would appear to give plaintiffs more bargaining power in settlement negotiations.434
Consolidated actions, such as class actions and multidistrict litigation, are another matter. Although courts are sometimes reluctant to
certify a class when personal injuries are involved,435 over the years,
there have been a number of successful consolidated class actions
brought against pharmaceutical companies.436
The final—and more controversial—economic incentive is civil litigation by governmental entities. During the past forty years or so,
state and local governments have sued various product manufacturers,
including pharmaceutical companies.437 The most significant example
of this is the litigation currently being brought by state and local governments against the manufacturers, distributors, and retail sellers of
opioid products.438 Some of these cases have been brought in state
courts by state attorneys general under the state’s parens patriae
429. See generally McCarthy, supra note 5.
430. Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923,
938–39 (2010).
431. Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99
GEO. L.J. 65, 85–86 (2010).
432. Andrew E. Falsetti, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidal Ideation: An Examination of the Medical
Literature, Case Law, and the Legal Liability of Drug Manufacturers, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 273,
283 (2002).
433. Estates of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (D.
Wyo. 2001).
434. Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 169, 172 (1998).
435. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 475 (2003).
436. E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.D.R. 450 (E.D. La. 2006); In re Lupron Marketing & Sales Practices Litig. MDL No. 1430, 2005 WL 2005 WL 1140553 (D. Mass. 2005).
437. See supra Part II, notes 72-78 (Exxon Valdez oil spill); 322-360 (opioids).
438. Ausness, supra note 353, at 566.
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power.439 Another group of cases, currently numbering more than
2,500, has been transferred to a federal district court in Cleveland
under the Multidistrict Litigation Act.440 So far, although a few cases
have been settled, most of them have not yet been resolved.441 However, it is fair to say that any settlement that is reached will cost the
defendants billions of dollars.
Factors such as regulatory sanctions and social pressure can sometimes lead to a change in corporate culture.442 For example, government sanctions, reinforced by pressure from women’s groups and civil
rights organizations, have had a salutary effect on corporate culture in
the entertainment industry.443 Government regulations against “redlining” have caused financial institutions to abandon the practice.444
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations have
led workers and employers to adopt practices that make the workplace safer.445
One regulatory device that has been used to change company practices, though not necessarily the underlying corporate culture, is a
compliance agreement which is typically part of a plea agreement or
settlement in a criminal or civil case, and which obligates the defendant to implement certain practices or to discontinue others in order
to comply with government laws or regulations.446 Both Purdue
Pharma and a number of other opioid companies have entered into
such an agreement after being charged with violating federal regulations involving the labeling or distribution of opioid products.447
439. Gable, supra note 354, at 312.
440. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Opioid Litigation: The FDA is MIA, 124 DICK. L. REV. 669,
670 (2020).
441. Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 323, at 319. One case, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter, resulted
in a decision for the state of Oklahoma. No. C1-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486, at *11
(Aug. 26, 2019). In addition, several other trials are currently underway or scheduled for trial in
various courts. Pannier, supra note 360, at 290.
442. David Hess & Christie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 311 (2008).
443. Sara Khorasani, Harvey of Hollywood: The Face That Launched a Thousand Stories, 41
HASTINGS COMMS. & ENT. L.J. 103, 123–24 (2019).
444. Steven Pitt & Daniel Maldonado, Prohibiting de Facto Insurance Redlining: Will Hurricane Katrina Draw a Discriminatory Redline in the Gulf Coast Sands?, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 199, 209–18 (2008).
445. Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholtz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 177, 199 (1993).
446. See generally F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Corporate Compliance Programs as a
Component of Plea Agreements and Civil and Administrative Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71
(1993).
447. E.g., Andrew F. Letting, Corporate Accounting for the Opioid Epidemic, 66 DOJ J. Fed.
L. & Prac. 159, 165, 168–70 (2018) (discussing agreements with Purdue, Mallinckrodt, McKesson
Corp. and Cardinal Health, Inc.).
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While these agreements have some value, their effectiveness may be
reduced by the fact that they are sometimes limited in duration.448
Corporations also respond to changes in social mores and attitudes.
Thus, for example, many companies are taking measures to reduce
their carbon footprint now that public concern about climate change
has increased.449 In addition, increasing diversity in the workplace has
led to the enactment of statutes prohibiting sexual harassment and
gender discrimination in employment.450
Corporate behavior may also be influenced by the threat of a negative market reaction to the disclosure of unethical practices.451 Most
pharmaceutical companies want to be regarded by the public as honest and socially responsible. Therefore, one would hope that past and
present scandals will eventually cause them to adopt a corporate culture that corresponds more closely to the benign public image that
they wish to cultivate.
CONCLUSION
Fraud and other forms of misconduct are pervasive and deeply ingrained in the operations and practices of the pharmaceutical industry.452 Among other things, drug companies have been accused of
manipulating the results of clinical trials, concealing damaging information revealed by failed trials, falsely assuring doctors that their
products are safe and effective, promoting off-label uses of their products, bribing doctors to overprescribe their drugs, and encouraging
healthcare providers to file false claims to Medicare and Medicaid.453
There are a number of factors that encourage such misconduct, including weak regulation, pressure from investors to maximize profits,
and internal compensation practices that encourage employees to increase sales at any cost. This Article has made a number of suggestions to encourage pharmaceutical companies to behave more
responsibly.454 First, the FDA must be given sufficient authority and
resources to tighten up the drug approval process and provide better
oversight over the marketing and promotion of prescription drugs and
448. Warin & Schwartz, supra note 446, at 86.
449. Emma M. Lloyd, “Greening” the Supply Chain: Why Corporate Leaders Make It Matter,
27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 31, 55–64 (2011).
450. Erika C. Collins, Global Diversity Initiatives, 46 INT’L LAW. 987, 989–96 (2012) (discussing gender-based anti-discrimination measures in various countries).
451. Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus Incentivizing
Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (2015).
452. McCarthy, supra note 5, at 443.
453. See supra Part III.
454. See supra Part V.
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medical devices. Second, penalties should be increased to the point
where the consequences of criminal convictions can no longer be
treated as a cost of doing business. Third, civil litigation may also act
as a deterrent, particularly when individual cases are consolidated in
class actions or multidistrict litigation. Fourth, in rare cases, state and
local governments might be allowed to sue drug companies when their
products create a public nuisance. Finally, public opinion and pressure
from shareholders, along with corporate compliance agreements,
might encourage a more socially responsible corporate culture.

